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HSE Alert

Communication Number:
COMM-0000024

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Issued By:
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Title / Subject:

Significant Safeworking Event – Communication Irregularities

Description:

Initial Incident Summary

On the 10th January 2024, a safeworking event occurred after Safeworking protection, Train Running Information (TRI), was granted to allow the undertaking of site correlation works and the finalisation of cable hauling activities, on the Vulcanised Indian Rubber (VIR) Project in Dry Creek, South Australia.

The Protection Officer made initial contact to Network Control at 0805 hours, requesting training running details for a TRI at Dry Creek between “signals 1 & 3 at Dry Creek South and Signal 135 at Dry Creek”, further stating they may shorten the length of the worksite to Signal 23, to increase track access between train movements.

The first TRI was taken from 0854 – 1030 hours, with the second TRI taken from 1140 – 1250 hours.

Both TRI conversations contained communication errors with the Network Controller communicating “Signal One and Three to Signal Two-Three,” and the Protection Officer communicating “Signal One-Three and Signal Two-Three.”

At 1307 hours, the Network Controller called the Protection Officer to initiate a further TRI in the belief that the train had passed the worksite. At this time the Protection Officer noted that they were still observing the train as it passed by their location. Immediate review of this inconsistency found that differing worksite limits were being conveyed between the Network Controller and Protection Officer, refer below.


Action Required:

Initial Key Learnings & Actions

The following initial key learnings have been identified and must be communicated and implemented:

- It is critical when first establishing contact with Network Control, the Competent Rail Safeworker (CRSW) identifies their geographical location.
- At the time of making a work on track request, the CRSW must identify the location by either the location name and Kilometrage (KM), or KM and Signal Number.
- Network Controllers must where possible verify the physical location of the CRSW’s KM location using for example the train control graph, workstation mimic panel or Network Information Books, and that it is located within the correct section of track before validating a track workers request to access the Rail Corridor.
- All safety critical communications must be communicated in accordance with the OPE-PR-043 ARTC Network Communications Standard, including the PACC (Professional, Accurate, Clear, Concise) Principles. The use of the PACC principals are a critical control and must be adhered to at all times. It is especially critical when defining signal numbers with similar numbers in adjacent sections.
- When using Train Running Information as a method of work on track, clearance times for train running information must be obtained / provided.

Upload Image Files:



Train Running Information (TRI) Limits.png

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Links to Supporting Documentation:

<https://www.artc.com.au/uploads/ARTC-Safety-Alert-No102-Safeworking-Communication-Protocols-Amendment.pdf>

<https://www.artc.com.au/uploads/ARTC-Safety-Alert-No-129-Two-Road-Rail-Vehicles-on-main-line-without-Authority.pdf>

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